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I.  Introduction
Interest rates are, arguably, one of the most important macroeconomic
variables.  They provide a key transmission channel for the propagation of
shocks throughout the economy, and play a fundamental role in asset pricing.
And yet, over the years there has been relatively little work aimed at trying
to understand the way in which interest rates behave in emerging economies.
This state of affairs contrasts sharply with that in the advanced countries,
where there have been a large number of empirical studies – many of them
in the finance tradition – that have tried to carefully understand interest rate
behavior along the yield curve.1
Surprisingly, perhaps, most of these advanced-nation studies have tended
to ignore the role of open economy factors and have assumed, either implicitly
or explicitly, that the economy in question is not subject to significant
* This paper has been prepared for the Conference celebrating CEMA’s Twentieth
Anniversary.  Buenos Aires, November 12-14, 1998.  I am indebted to Rajesh Chakrabarti
and Alejandro Jara for their assistance.
1 See, for example, the studies discussed in Roll (1997).JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
influences from the rest of the world.  For example, the book by Campbell,
Lo and MacKinlay (1997), a required reference for anyone doing empirical
work in finance these days, does not even list the terms “exchange rate risk”,
“devaluation”, “international”, or “interest parity” in the index.2  The literature
in the macroeconomics tradition, on the other hand, has been somewhat more
receptive to incorporating open economy issues, and a number of studies
have indeed investigated the way in which the existence of international
linkages across financial markets impacts on interest rate behavior in the
world economy.3  There is also a small literature on interest rates in developing
countries that takes into account the role of international factors.   Much of
this literature has tried to understand the extent to which open economy
variables  – and more specifically, world interest rates and expectations of
devaluation – affect a country’s domestic interest rates, in a world where
there is imperfect capital mobility.  Invariably, this literature has concluded
that the “actual” degree of financial openness of a country exceeds its “legal”
degree of openness.4
In this paper I use, weekly and monthly data to analyze in some detail
interest rate behavior in three Latin American countries during the 1990s –
Argentina, Chile and Mexico.  These three countries provide a unique
opportunity for investigating the way in which interest rates behave under
alternative institutional arrangements.  In particular, these countries’
experiences allow us to analyze interest rate dynamics under alternative
exchange rate regimes and rules regarding capital mobility.  During the period
under study Argentina had a fixed exchange rate, backed by a currency board-
type of monetary system; Mexico moved from a narrow, upward sloping,
exchange rate band to a floating regime; and Chile had a band system with a
2  There are, of course, exceptions in this tradition.  My colleague Richard Roll has considered
the open economy angle in a number of his studies.
3  See, for example, Marston (1993).
4 See, for example, Edwards (1985), Dooley (1995) and Dooley et al (1998).
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changing width.5  Moreover, while in Argentina and Mexico free capital
mobility was allowed, in Chile there were unremunerated reserve requirement
on international capital inflows throughout most of the period.  Additionally,
the time period considered – 1992 through mid 1998 – allows us to investigate
the way in which interest rates in these countries were affected by the major
currency crises that occurred during this turbulent years.  In  should be pointed
out  at the outset that the use of high frequency data introduces some limitation
into the analysis, since very few macroeconomics variables have data at the
weekly frequency.  For this reason the analysis concentrates on those variables
for which the adequate information is available, placing a special emphasis
on nominal interest rates – both in domestic and foreign currency.
The paper is organized as follows:  Section I is the introduction; in Section
II I briefly discuss the most important issues and I present the key
characteristics of the data.  In Section III I deal with interest rate volatility in
some detail.  I estimate a series of statistical models using Argentine, Mexican
and Chilean data in an effort to understand the extent and determinants of
interest rate volatility.  More specifically, I investigate whether external
factors, such as third-country instability, have affected interest rate variability
in these countries.  This is an important issue for the contagion debate that
has emerged in the aftermath of the Mexican, East Asian and Russian crises.
Section IV deals with international interest rate differentials and convergence.
I compute uncovered interest differentials and analyze their dynamic behavior.
In this section I investigate, for the case of Chile, whether the imposition of
controls on capital mobility have affected interest rate differentials as the
authorities had hoped.
5 Due to space considerations I don’t provide a detailed discussion of these three countries
exchange rate regimes during this period.  On Argentina see, for example, Rodriguez (1994);
on Mexico see Edwards (1998a) and Edwards and Savastano (1998);  on Chile’s exchange
rate band  see Dornbusch and Edwards (1993).
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II. The Data and the Issues:  A Preliminary Discussion
The main interest of this paper is to understand interest rate behavior
under Argentina’s “currency convertibility” exchange rate regime.   In order
to do this I analyze interest rate behavior in three Latin American countries
– Argentina, Chile and Mexico — during the 1990s.
In Figure 1 I present weekly data for short term (30 days) deposit interest
rates for the three countries.  The data were obtained from the Datastream
data set.  For Argentina and Chile I used average nominal interest rates paid
by commercial banks on 30 days deposits;  for Mexico I used interest rates
on 28 days certificates of deposits.  For Argentina and Mexico the series
start on the first week of 1992, while for Chile the series start on the first
week of 1994.  For all three countries the series end on the first week of
June, 1998.  All data are annualized.6  Figure 2, on the other hand, contains
for all three countries the nominal exchange rate, at weekly intervals, between
January 1992 and the first week of June, 1998.
Several interesting facts emerge from these Figures.  First, all three
countries exhibit very large increases in interest rates in late December, 1994.
These jumps correspond to the Mexican currency crisis, and subsequent
“tequila effect.”  Interestingly enough, however, and as captured in Figure 2,
in neither Argentina, nor in Chile was the exchange rate devalued following
the Mexican crisis.  In fact, the increase in interest rates was a fundamental
element in these countries’ defense of their exchange rate strategy in the
months following the Mexican crisis.  Second, in all three countries there is
also a spike – although a much smaller one —  in interest rates in October of
1997, at a time when the East Asian crisis intensified, and Hong Kong’s
stock market tumbled.  Third, Chile’s short term interest rates appear to revert
to their mean at a faster rate than in either Argentina or Mexico.  In fact, the
6 For Argentina and Mexico the data are provided on annual terms.  For Chile, data on
monthly returns are provided.  The yearly returns reported in the table were obtained by
compounding.
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Figure 1. Short Term Nominal Interest Rates:
Argentina, Mexico and Chile (Weekly Data, 1992-98)
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Figure 2:  Exchange Rates with Respect
to U.S. Dollar in Argentina, Chile and
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AR(1) coefficient for Chile’s weekly nominal interest rate for 1994-1998 is
0.87, while that for Argentina is 0.93.  For Mexico this coefficient was, during
1995-98,  0.97.7  Third, throughout most of the period Mexican short term
nominal interest rates were higher than those of Chile and Argentina.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for all three countries.  Data are
provided for interest rates, the annualized rate of devaluation, and the rate of
inflation for the complete period, as well as for each year since 1992.  The
rate of devaluation has been computed as the annualized rate of devaluation
during the holding period for each of these securities.  The rate of inflation
is the year-over-year rate.  As may be seen, during the full period under
study (1992-98), Argentina had the lowest overall nominal interest rates,
and in 1996-98 the less volatile ones.  Chile’s rates gradually declined
throughout the period, while maintaining a similar degree of volatility (as
measured by the standard deviation) year after year.  This contrasts with
Chile’s exchange rate movements during these years, a period of rather low
rates of devaluation but high volatility.  The data on Mexico show both high
interest rates, as well as a high degree of volatility, especially after the 1994
devaluation.  An interesting feature of these data – not reported in detail due
to space considerations – is that the weekly distributions of interest rates
and devaluation rates appear to be significantly skewed.  This is particular
the case for Mexico in 1994, where, for example, there was a significant
divergence between the mean of the weekly annualized rate of  devaluation
(68.9%) and its median (7.9%).
The data in Table 1 also show that during  the years of Mexico-induced
turmoil – during 1994, and especially 1995 —, Argentina’s nominal interest
rates were more volatile than Chile’s rates.  As time passed by, however, and
tranquility and confidence returned to Argentina’s financial markets,
Argentina’s volatility became the lowest of the three countries.  Interestingly
enough, after October 1997, when the East Asian crises finally impacted on
7 A high degree of persistence is a well known feature of short term interest rates in the U.S.
See, for example, Bekaert et el (1997).
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the Latin American region, Chile’s interest rates became more volatile, while
Argentine rates did not exhibit a significant change.  In Section III of this
paper I investigate in greater detail the factors affecting short term interest
rate volatility in each of these countries.
The interest rate data presented in Figure 1 and Table 1 refer to 30 days
nominal interest rates.  The data on inflation presented in Table 1 show that,
for most years and countries, average real deposit interest rates were positive.
An important question from an open economy perspective refers to foreign
currency denominated returns;  these returns play a crucial role in determining
capital movements, and are related to the cost of capital faced by the country’s
exporters.  Figure 3 displays the annualized realized return expressed in
dollars for the three countries in the sample.  In Table 2 I present the average
annualized weekly rate of return in dollars.  For the cases of  Argentina and
Mexico these figures should be interpreted as the dollar return actually
obtained on average, in dollars, by an investor who bought these securities
every week during the sample period.8  For these two countries the investor
could be either a domestic resident or a foreign national. In Chile, however,
due to the existence of controls on capital mobility, these figures should be
interpreted as pertaining only to local investors.  For comparison purposes,
in Table 2 I have also included data on the 30 days CDs in the U.S.
As Figure 3 shows, Argentina, was the only country where realized dollar
returns were positive throughout the period.  In Mexico, for example, during
1994 (the year of the devaluation crisis) the average weekly dollar returns
were very negative (-53.8).  It would be tempting to think that these negative
(ex post) realized returns in Mexico were exclusively the results of the
collapse in the value of the peso in December of that year.  This, however,
was not the case;  for almost every 4 week-period during 1994 actual realized
dollar returns were negative.  Interestingly enough, however, with the
exception of 1994 and the first five months of 1998, realized ex-post average
dollar returns in Mexico exceeded by a significant margin those obtained in
8 Notice that I am not assuming reinvestment in the same security.
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Figure 3:  Annualized Returns in Dollars,
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Table 2 : Realized (Ex Post) Dollar Returns
ARGENTINA CHILE MEXICO     UNITED STATES
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
1992-1998 10.7 5.3 11.5 21.1* 10.8*  94.4 4.16 1.06
1992 18.6 5.8 n.a. n.a. 21.1  10.6 3.18 0.38
1993 11.7 4.4 n.a. n.a. 21.2  12.0 2.6 0.06
1994  8.5 1.8 19.4 14.2 -53.8 197.7 3.7 0.77
1995 12.6 4.6 12.3 31.4 23.8 106.4 5.2 0.10
1996  7.4 0.8  8.9  9.2 33.5  27.2 4.75 0.07
1997  6.9 1.0  6.2 20.1 19.0  29.8 5.15 0.14
1998 7.0  0.8  8.3  23.5  3.9  25.2 5.22 0.04
the U.S.  These high Mexican returns, however, came at the cost of very
high risk – indeed, as may be seen in Table 2 the standard deviations of short
term Mexican rates were several orders of magnitude higher than standard
deviations for U.S. CDs during that period.
In light of the preliminary data analysis presented here, in the sections
that follow I investigate a number of issues regarding interest rate behavior
of interest rates in Latin America during 1992-98.  In Section III I concentrate
on interest rate volatility, while in Section IV I deal with deviations from
uncovered interest parity.
III. Nominal Interest Rate Volatility and External Contagion
The data in Table 2 clearly indicate that for all three countries interest
rate volatility changed markedly over time.  An important question is whether
this volatility has been the result of domestic factors, or whether it has been
influenced – at least partially – by some form of international contagion.  In
the context of the current turmoil in international financial markets, it is
particularly interesting to explore whether there has been “volatility
contagion” coming from other emerging markets.
The changing degree of volatility displayed in Table 2 suggests that, during
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this period, interest rate volatility in the three countries can be explained by
models in the generalized autoregressive conditionally hetereoskedastic
(GARCH) tradition.  Most GARCH-based empirical work on changing returns
volatility in the industrial countries has tended to ignore, both in the mean
and conditional variance equations, open economy factors (Bollerslev et al
1992).9  In this section I explicitly deal with international issues, and I
investigate the extent to which there has been “volatility contagion” across
emerging Latin American countries.  More specifically, I analyze whether
volatility in Mexico – a country that is not only financially important, but
one that has also unleashed major global crises in the past – has affected
interest rate volatility in Argentina and Chile. 10
Consider the following GARCH model of interest rates in a particular
country:
D r t  =  q  + S f j  x t - j  + h t (1)
s2
t  =  j  + a h2
t - 1 + b s2
t - 1 +  S gj yt - j (2)
Where r is the nominal interest rate;  the xs are variables that affect
changes in the interest rate, and may include lagged values of  D r , as well as
other domestic or international variables; h are innovations to interest rate
changes;  s2
t  is the conditional variance; and the  yt-j  are variables, other
than past squared innovations or lagged forecast variance, that help explain
interest rate volatility.
In this section I report results obtained from the estimation of models
based on equations (1) and (2) for Argentina and Chile during the 1990s.
My main interest is to investigate whether there has been “volatility
contagion”, or “volatility spillovers” from Mexico to the two South American
9   There is, however, a long literature on exchange rate volatility based on GARCH models.
10   See Campbell et al (1997) for the use of GARCH to model changing volatility in financial
markets.
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nations.11  I do this by including Mexico-specific volatility variables in the
estimation of  the conditional variance equation (2).  In the first step of the
analysis I estimated, by ordinary least squares, a number of versions of
equation (1) for Argentina and Chile.  The analysis of the residuals clearly
showed the presence of  conditional heteroskedasticity.  In every case Engel’s
LM test indicated that the null hypothesis of absence of ARCH was rejected
at conventional levels:  its value, with four lags, was 29.3 for Argentina, and
9.56 for Chile.
The second step in the analysis consisted in selecting a group of indexes
on Mexican volatility to be included in the estimation of the conditional
variance equations for Argentina and Chile.  In order for volatility to be
positive at all times, these indexes should be nonnegative, as should be their
estimated coefficient.  For this reason I focused on the following four
indicators of Mexican volatility:  (1)  The estimated conditional variance
from a fourth order GARCH model for Mexican short term interest rates.12
This variable was called Garchmex.  (2)  A dummy variable that took the
value of one in any week when the Mexican peso depreciated by 3 percent
or more, and zero otherwise (Dummex).  (3) The absolute value of weekly
changes in Mexican short term nominal interest rates (Absdmex).  And (4),
the estimated conditional variance from a GARCH(1,1) model of Mexico’s
rate of devaluation.  This variable was called Garchmexdev.
The system actually estimated for Argentina and Chile is given by
equations (1’) and (2’):
D r t  =  q  +  f 1  D r t -1 +  f 2 time +  h t (1’)
11 There is an important literature on stock markets “volatility spillover.”   See, for example,
King and Wadhwani (1990).
12   The mean equation included a constant, a once lagged change in the nominal interest rate
and a dummy variable that took the value of one in any week when the peso depreciated by
more than three percent.  The results from this estimation for Mexico is not reported here
due to space considerations.
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s2
t  =  j  + a h2
t - 1 + b s2
t - 1 +  g  MEXVOL, (2’)
where MEXVOL refers to the Mexican volatility indicators defined above.
When more complicated specifications for equation (1’) were used, very
similar results were obtained.13
The estimation of these equations allows us to address a number of issues:
first, parameters a and b provide an idea of the nature of volatility in these
countries, including its degree of persistence; and second, and more
important, the estimation of (2’) will provide information on whether during
this period there has been an emerging markets “volatility contagion.”  If
such effect exists, the estimated coefficient of MEXVOL will be positive
and significantly different from zero.  Third, the comparison of the estimated
value of g for Chile and Argentina will provide some information on the
interest rate volatility process in these two countries.  If, as the authorities
expected, Chile’s capital controls have been effective we would expect a
smaller coefficient of g in Chile than in Argentina.  And fourth, the estimation
of these equation will allow us to compute estimated series of conditional
interest rate volatility in the two countries.  The evolution of these series
through time will shed some light – but only some — on how the different
institutional settings affect interest rate volatility in these two nations.
To the extent that there is some kind of international arbitrage, nominal
interest rates in a particular country will be linked to world interest rates,
expectations of devaluation and risk premia.  This means, then, that D rt  will
capture changes in these open economy variables, and that ht will reflect
innovations related to these variables.  My interest, in estimating (1’) and
(2’) is to investigate whether there is an independent role for emerging market
volatility contagion.  If this is the case the estimated value of g will be
significantly positive.
13   For both countries I also estimated an equation for the mean that included, in addition to
an AR(1) term, changes in US short term interest rates and an indicator for expectations of
devaluation.  The results obtained for the conditional variance equation were very similar to
those reported here.
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Tables 3 and 4 contain the conditional variance estimates for Argentina
and Chile.  N is the number of observations; LM test is Engel’s test for the
presence of residual conditional heteroskedasticity; and Wald c2 is a test for
the null hypothesis that a + b = 1.14  Several interesting results emerge from
these tables.  First, a GARCH(1,1) model seems to perform rather well, with
the coefficients of both lagged squared innovations and the lagged variance
being always significantly different from zero.  Higher order GARCH
representations did not perform as well, when measured by the value of the
log likelihood function.  Second, and related to the previous point, according
to Engel’s LM test, the hypothesis that some conditional heteroskedasticity
remains in the residuals is rejected in all cases.
Third, and more important for the current study, these results show a
very different effect of Mexico’s volatility spillovers on Argentina and Chile’s
conditional variances.  While in the case of Argentina the coefficients of
Mexican volatility indexes are significantly different to zero in every
regression, they are never significant in the case of Chile.  This suggests,
quite strongly, that while Argentina was subject to “volatility contagion”
during this period, Chile was spared from it.15 There are two possible
explanations for these results.  First, it is possible that during this period
international investors considered that Chile had a stronger economy and
that, as a consequence, they did not pass onto Chile apprehensions stemming
from Mexico.  Another way of putting this, is that while during this period
international investors differentiated between Chile and Mexico, they did
not differentiate between Argentina and Mexico.  The second possible
explanation is that the existence of capital controls in Chile during this period
14   The results in Tables 3 and 4 were obtained when contemporaneous Mexican volatility
was considered.  If these indexes are entered with one period lag, the basic results are still
maintained.
15   This result is independent of the sample used.  When the Argentine equations are reesti-
mated for the shorter period for which there are data for Chile, the basic results did not
change.
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Table 3.  Interest Rate Volatility in Argentina*
(GARCH Estimates:  Weekly Data 1992-1998)
EQ 3.1 EQ 3.2 EQ 3.3 EQ 3.4
C 0.010 0.020 -0.002 0.010
(1.37) (6.245) (-0.456) (3.045)
et-1
2 0.864 0.439 1.248 0.507
(7.669) (8.706) 11.301) (7.806)
st-1
2 0.407 0.588 0.377 0.556
(7.669) (26.548) (14.295) (18.109)
GARCHMEX 0.008 __ __ __
(7.847)
DUMMEX __ 6.586 __ __
(11.001)
ABSDMEX __ __ 0.018 __
(4.593)
GARCHMEXDEV __ __ __ 0.034
(10.238)
N 333 333 333 332
LM Test 4.41 4.84 13.865 4.41
Wald c2 15.01 0.56 13.10 1.89
* The figures in parentheses are the t-values.   See text for details.
partially insulated the country from short term external shocks.  Naturally,
these two possible explanations are not contradictory, and both of them could,
indeed, play a role in explaining the results in Tables 3 and 4.  In next section
I investigate in some detail the extent to which Chile’s capital controls actually
succeeded in insulating the country from external disturbances.
Tables 3 and 4 show that in six out of the eight regressions it is not possible
to reject the hypothesis that a + b = 1, suggesting that we are really in the
presence of IGARCH(1,1) models.  In this case the unconditional variance
does not converge  to  (j/ (1- a - b)),  as  in  the  most  common  case when
a + b < 1.  As Campbell et al (1997) have argued, however, there will still be
a nondegenerate stationary distribution for s2
t .  In the regressions on
Argentina and Chile in Tables 3 and 4, the conditional expected value of
volatility k weeks in the future will be equal to (s2
t  + k j).
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An interesting question is whether the conditional volatility reacts to
innovations on interest rate in a symmetric way.  The estimation of threshold
GARCH models suggest that in both countries negative innovations to
nominal interest rates have a negative effect on the conditional variance.
These estimates, not reported here due to space considerations, do not alter
the findings regarding “volatility contagion” in Tables 3 and 4.16  Finally, an
analysis of the determinants of Mexico’s interest rate volatility suggests that
there is no “Argentine effect”.
Table 4.  Interest Rate Volatility in Chile*
(GARCH Estimates:  Weekly Data 1994-1998)
EQ 4.1 EQ 4.2 EQ 4.3 EQ 4.4
C 0.401 0.400 0.348 0.406
(4.188) (4.209) (3.019) (4.313)
et-1
2 0.489 0.486 0.505 0.491
(3.807) (3.788) (3.901) (3.755)
st-1
2 0.462 0.465 0.456 0.454
(5.686) (5.662) (5.776) (5.483)
GARCHMEX -0.001 __ __ __
(-0.623)
DUMMEX __ -0.501 __ __
(-0.946)
ABSDMEX __ __ 0.011 __
(0.267)
GARCHMEXDEV __ __ __ -0.001
(-0.552)
N 227 227 227 228
LM Test 4.57 8.487 8.37 8.29
Wald c2 0.38 0.35 0.22 0.44
* The figures in parentheses are the t-values.   See the text for details
16   On threshold GARCH models see, for example, Glosten et al (1990).  The results on the
threshold Garch for Chile and Argentina are available on request.
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IV. Interest Rate Differentials, Convergence and Capital
Controls
If there are no restrictions to capital mobility, and under the assumption
of risk neutrality and in the absence of country risk, the uncovered interest
arbitrage condition will hold, and deviations from it would be white noise
and unpredictable.  The speed at which these deviations from interest
arbitrage are eliminated is an empirical question, but in a well functioning
market one would expect it to happen rather fast. The existence of restrictions
to capital mobility and of country risk, however, alter this basic equation in
a fundamental way.  In this case there will be an equilibrium interest rate
differential (d):
dt =  rt - r*t - EDet  =  k + R + ut (3)
Where rt is the domestic interest rate, r*t the international interest rate
for a security of the same maturity and risk characteristics, EDe is the expected
rate of devaluation, k is the tax equivalence of the capital restriction, R is the
country risk premium, and ut is an iid random variable.  As in the case of free
capital mobility, if at any moment in time the actual interest rate differential
exceeds (k + R), there will be incentives to arbitrageurs to move funds in
and/or out of the country.  This process will continue until the equilibrium
interest rate differential is reestablished.  The speed at which this process
takes place will, in principle, depend on the degree of development of the
domestic capital market, as well as on the degree of capital mobility existing
in the country in question.  Countries with stiffer restrictions will experience
slow corrections of deviations from the equilibrium interest rate differential
(Dooley 1995, Dooley et al 1997).  Additionally, as equation (3) shows, the
degree of capital restrictions (that is, k) will also affect the value towards
which the interest rate differential will converge.  In this section I provide
some evidence regarding uncovered interest rate differentials in our three
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Latin American countries.  I use monthly data to analyze the speed at which
these differentials tend to disappear, and I investigate whether the imposition
of capital controls in Chile in 1991 allowed the monetary authorities to have
greater control on short term interest rates.17
Table 5 contains summary data on weekly deviations from uncovered
interest parity between the three countries and the U.S. for 1992-1998.  In
calculating these data I have assumed that the public has rational expectations
and that Det = EDet  + mt , where mt is a forecasting error with the usual
characteristics.  Thus, in the computation of interest rate differentials the
expected rate of devaluation was replaced by the actual (annualized) rate of
devaluation during the month in question.  As may be seen, the average
deviations declined steadily in Argentina between 1995 and 1998.  Moreover,
for the case of Argentina these series had the lowest standard deviations.  A
second interesting feature of these data is that the annual standard deviations
are rather large and that, as a consequence, the 95% confidence interval are
large, including in many years the zero value.
IV. 1.  Uncovered Interest Rate Differentials and Convergence
In a world where there is (some) capital mobility one would expect that
interest rate differentials would tend to converge to some equilibrium level
determined by country risk considerations.  This means that these series
should be stationary and should not exhibit unit roots.  Table 6 contains
Augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root tests for monthly
interest rate differentials for the three countries in the sample. For the case
of Mexico two periods were considered, in order to avoid the effects of the
1994 devaluation on the computation of the test statistics.  As may be seen,
in all cases the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root is rejected at
conventional levels.  Moreover, it is not possible to reject the alternative
hypothesis that these series converge through time.





























Table 5.  Deviations from Uncovered Interest Parity with USA
           ARGENTINA CHILE                                                          MEXICO
Max Min Mean SD t Max Min Mean SD t Max Min Mean SD t
1992-98 36.14 -2.00 6.54 5.78 1.13 75.91 -67.49 6.78 21.24 0.32 262.71 -885.71 6.63 94.47 0.07
1992 36.14 5.40 15.63 5.97 2.62 na na na na na 37.89 -9.49 18.20 10.76 1.69
1993 26.52 3.96 9.12 4.37 2.09 na na na na na 63.88 -30.80 18.55 12.02 1.54
1994 8.61 1.38 4.80 1.62 2.96 48.42 -21.62 15.67 14.31 1.10 41.81 -885.71 -57.57 198.07 0.29
1995 20.54 3.35 7.29 4.50 1.62 75.91 -37.22 6.63 31.23 0.21 262.71 -235.11 20.17 105.94 0.19
1996 4.42 -0.07 2.64 0.79 3.34 24.93 -17.21 4.06 9.21 0.44 100.25 -51.20 28.80 26.90 1.07
1997 4.58 -2.00 1.78 1.07 1.66 40.88 -67.49 -0.82 22.30 0.04 61.37 -90.86 11.69 31.10 0.38
1998 3.34 0.97 1.75 0.71 2.46 42.60 -41.83 6.30 19.30 0.33 28.17 -54.97 -0.59 25.73 0.02
(till June)
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An interesting  question  is whether the speed at which interest rate
differentials tend to disappear differs across countries.  Generally speaking,
one would expect that countries where capital  can move more freely will
exhibit a more rapid  convergence towards  equilibrium.  One way to test
this proposition is by estimating some form  of autoregressions for each
country.
Assume that interest rate differential can be represented by the following
univariate process:
B(L) dt  =  a + G(L) ut,  (4)
where L is the lag operator, B(L) and G(L) are polynomial functions of
L, and a is a coefficient.  The form of these polynomials will determine the
dynamics of dt , including whether it will converge to a steady state value.
This steady state, in turn will be determined by the form of the two
polynomials and by a.  The simplest case is obtained when:
B(L) = 1 - b L;   G(L) = 1. (5)
In this case interest rate differentials are characterized by an AR(1)
process, and to the extent that b lies inside the unit circle, d will converge to
(a / (1 - b)).  In the absence of controls and with a zero country risk premium,
we would expect (a / (1 - b)) @ 0, with interest rate differentials converging
Table 6.  Unit Root Tests
                               ARGENTINA      CHILE                      MEXICO
92:1-94:11 95:11-98:5
ADF -4.35 -4.56 -3.80 -5.18
Phillips-Perron -4.37 -5.16 -4.42 -13.11
Note: All tests reject the hypothesis of a unit root at conventional levels of confidence.
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to zero.  Moreover, in this case, we would expect that b would be rather low,
with interest rate differentials disappearing very rapidly.   With country risk
and capital restrictions, however, a would be different from zero, b will be
rather high, and interest rate differentials will converge to a positive value.
Table 7 presents results from the estimation, using Seemingly Unrelated
Regressions, of AR(1) equations for Argentina and Chile, for 1995-1998:6.18
“Wald” is a test for equality of the AR coefficients across the two countries.
A number of interesting features emerge from this table.  First, in both
countries the AR coefficient is significantly smaller than one.  Second, and
contrary  to expectations, the point estimate of the AR coefficient is larger
for Argentina than for Chile.  As pointed out above, due to the existence of
capital restrictions in the latter country, the opposite result was expected.
However, as the Wald statistic shows, in spite of this difference in the point
estimates, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that these coefficients
are equal across countries.  Third, the R2 coefficient is much higher for
Argentina than for Chile.  This is possibly the result of the high monthly
variability exhibited by Chile’s exchange rates – and thus rate of devaluation
– during this period.  In order to address this issue, in the analysis of Chile’s
interest rate differentials that follows I used estimated one step-ahead
forecasts of devaluation to construct alternative series for uncovered interest
rate differentials.
IV. 2. Capital Controls and Interest Rate Convergence: Chile’s Experience
Since the mid 1980s Chile’s monetary authorities have used interest rate
targeting as one of the main – if not the main – antinflationary tool.  More
specifically, as a way to reduce inflation the central bank has systematically
attempted to maintain relatively high interest rates.  This policy, however,
became increasingly difficult to sustain during the late 1980s and 1990s when,
18   Due to the break introduced to the series by the 1994 devaluation, Mexico was excluded
from this estimation.
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as a result of Chile’s improving stance in international financial markets,
higher domestic rates started to attract increasingly large volumes of capital.
A fundamental objective of the capital restrictions policy in effect since 1991,
then, has been to allow the country to maintain a higher interest rate.
According to Cowan and de Gregorio (1997), “capital controls allowed policy
makers to rely on the domestic interest rate as the main instrument for reducing
inflation…[T]he reserve requirement has permitted maintaining the domestic
interest rate above the international interest rate, without imposing excessive
pressure on the exchange rate (p.16)”.  In this subsection I use a battery of
time series estimates to formally investigate the way in which capital
restrictions have, in fact, affected interest rate differentials, and thus the ability
to perform independent monetary policy, in Chile.
Equation (3) provides a useful, and very simple, framework, for evaluating
the extent to which Chile’s capital controls, affected the authorities’ ability
to control – at least partially – interest rates. In a world with changing
policies, k is not constant through time.  With other things given, it would be
expected that the imposition (or tightening) of capital restrictions will have
Table 7. Convergence of Uncovered Interest Rate










Durbin Watson 1.722 1.896
Wald 1.173 —
       *The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  See text for details.
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two effects on the behavior of the interest rate differential.  First it will increase
the value towards which this differential converges;  second, it will reduce
the speed at which this convergence takes place.  This means, under stricter
restrictions on capital mobility the monetary authority gains greater control
over domestic interest rates in two ways:  first, it can maintain a higher interest
rate differential – that is, the steady state value of d will be higher than what
it would have been otherwise — , and second, d can deviate from its long
run equilibrium for longer period of times.
If there are policy changes – and, in particular, if there are changes in the
extent of capital restrictions – we would expect that the parameters in equation
(4) will change.  The extent and importance of these changes can be analyzed
empirically by identifying and estimating univariate models of interest rate
differentials for different periods of time.  Table 8 presents the results obtained
for Chile from the estimation of a number of alternative ARMA processes
for d for four different time periods.19  Since in all cases the AR(1)
representation proved to be adequate, in the discussion that follows I will
concentrate on these results.  It is particularly interesting to compare the no-
restrictions period (1988:01-1991:06) with the restrictions period (1991:07-
1996:12).  As may be seen, the AR coefficient is slightly lower in the second
(no capital restrictions) subsample  (0.40), than in the first one (0.46).  This
is contrary to what was expected;  however, the difference is not statistically
significant, as a test statistic rejects strongly the hypothesis of different AR
coefficients across samples.  According to these results the point estimate of
the a coefficient is higher in the first subsample, although once again the
difference is not statistically significant.
The results obtained from  this specific splitting of the sample, then, may
be interpreted as suggesting that there are very few, if any, differences in the
dynamics of interest rate differentials in these two periods.  These results,
however, should be interpreted with care, since they are subject to at least
19  Since Datastream only has Chilean data since 1992, the data in these regressions were
taken from the International Financial Statistics.  Expected devaluation was calculated as a
one step ahead forecast from and ARMA(1,1) model for devaluation in Chile.
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Table 8.  Measure Of  Persistence: Chile  - Different Samples




AR(1) 0.06 0.45 1.35 4.56
AR(2) 0.06 0.42 0.04 1.20 4.25
MA(1) 0.06 -0.40 8.65 10.65
MA(2) 0.06 -0.23+0.37i -0.2-0.37i 1.35 4.27
ARMA(1,1) 0.06 0.43 -0.03 1.24 4.35
ARMA(2,2) 0.06 0.31 -0.12  -0.14+0.26i -0.14-0.26i 0.93 3.99
1982:11-1991:06
AR(1) 0.05 0.18 8.35 18.87
AR(2) 0.04 0.13-0.29i 0.13+0.29i 8.18 19.51
MA(1) 0.04 -0.26 6.73 17.31
MA(2) 0.04 -0.14+0.24i -0.14-0.24i 5.46 15.77
ARMA(1,1) 0.04 -0.02 -0.28 6.85 17.46
ARMA(2,2) 0.04 0.05+0.32i 0.05-0.32i  -0.09+0.37i -0.09-0.37i 5.06 15.75
1988:1-1991:06
AR(1) 0.12 0.46 2.30 4.83
AR(2) 0.12 0.26-0.31i 0.26+0.31i 1.00 3.29
MA(1) 0.12 -0.61 0.25 2.13
MA(2) 0.12 0.05 -0.64 0.38 2.25
ARMA(1,1) 0.12 -0.31 -0.84 2.05 3.86
ARMA(2,2) 0.17 0.87 -0.55 0.97 -0.98 4.19 8.54
1991:7-1996:12
AR(1) 0.09 0.40 7.65 9.82
AR(2) 0.09 0.25+0.4i 0.25-0.4i 5.33 6.90
MA(1) 0.09 -0.44 8.18 10.02
MA(2) 0.09 -0.26-0.22i -0.26+0.22i 6.10 7.92
ARMA(1,1) 0.09 0.15 -0.35 6.62 8.34
ARMA(2,2) 0.09 0.53+0.28i 0.53-0.28i 0.80 -0.17 1.96 3.81
two limitations:  first, during the period under analysis the country risk
premium associated with Chile experimented some important changes.  This
means that a in equation (4) will tend to change through time.  Additionally,
a will also tend to change since the implicit tax on the restriction capital
mobility (k) is a function of r*.  Second, it is possible that the dynamics of
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interest rate differentials did not change exactly at the time of the imposition
of the restrictions – after all the implicit tax was rather small at first, and
there was substantial evasion.
These issues were addressed in two ways:  First, I added Chile’s ranking
in Euromoney’s Country Risk Ratings as a proxy for the country risk premia,
as well as the US interest rate to the regression.  And second, I considered
two alternative dates for splitting the sample:  July, 1992 and January 1993.
Both of these dates correspond to a tightening of the inflows restrictions.
The inclusion of the country risk proxy and of the international interest rates
had no significant effects on the estimation;  in fact, the sign of the country
risk proxy was the opposite of what was expected and non significant, while
that of the international interest rate was non significant.  Changing the dates
did, on the other hand, have an effect on the estimation.  This may be seen in
Table 9, where the results from an augmented equation for the dynamics of
interest rate differentials are presented.  In this equation dummy variables
that take the value of one for the post restrictions period have been included.
Two interesting features emerge from this table.  First, the coefficient of
lagged differentials is higher for both post restrictions periods. Moreover, as
may be seen the results indicate that the (d DUMMY) variable is marginally
significant.  This suggests that during (at least some of) the post restrictions
period interest rate differential were more sluggish than in the pre-restrictions
period.  This supports the notion that the restrictions allowed the monetary
authorities greater short term control over domestic interest rates.  The fact,
however, that the estimated valued of the constant experienced a slight decline
in the post restrictions period suggests that the authorities may not have had
as much control over interest rates in the longer run.
In order to investigate the dynamic behavior of interest rates further I
estimated the following equation using a rolling regressions technique and
monthly data:
dt  =  a +  b  dt-1  +  ut (6)
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Table 9.  Dynamics of Interest Rate Differential: in Chile,
1988-96 (monthly data)
















Two alternative windows for 24 and 36 months were considered.  The
estimated coefficients were then used to estimate a rolling value of the steady
state interest rate differential.  These results are presented in Figure 4, 5 and
6.  In constructing these figures I dated each coefficient by the last observation
included in the sample.  For example, in the case of the 24 months window,
the observation for 1995:06 corresponds to the respective coefficient
estimated using a sample spanning from 1993:06 through 1995:06.  To the
right of the vertical lines, then, the complete sample used to estimate the
coefficients corresponds to the post restrictions period.  These results suggest
the following:  in the post restrictions period the degree of persistence of
interest rate differentials (the estimated value of b) has increased slightly.
This happened after a period (1990-93) of  gradual decline in persistence,
which largely corresponded to the decline in Chile’s risk premium.  Although
the increase in  b has been rather small, the trend is quite clear, and supports
the view that, as the authorities had intended, the imposition of restrictions
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on capital movements increased their short term control over domestic interest
rates.  The results in Figure 6 on the rolling estimates of the steady state
interest rate differentials are less clear cut.  However, regarding the post
restrictions period, these estimates (and in particular the 24 months window
estimates) suggest that the steady state differential trended gently upward
until mid 1995;  from that time onward a decline is observed.  The  most
likely explanation for this reduction in the equilibrium differential is the
recent improvement in Chile’s country risk position.  Although these results
cannot be considered as conclusive or definitive, they do provide a note of
skepticism on Chile’s ability to control interest rate differentials over the
longer run.
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